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ABSTRACT
Uncertainty creeps into the software development process in many ways, shapes and forms.
In the early stages of software development, key sources of uncertainty are the human
stakeholders who help formulate the requirements of the software product. An added layer of
uncertainty is inherent as requirements analysts have to deal with subjective, and often
conflicting, estimates that humans make, estimates that may significantly affect both the software
development process and the eventual software product. Our position is two-fold. We stipulate
that in situations where analysts (and later developers) have to deal with human evaluations of
uncertainty, special methods and procedures should be used to elicit this information, reconcile
this information, and, most importantly, use this information for decision-making. We also note
that significant developments are unfolding in the field of Artificial Intelligence in two areas
related to dealing with uncertainty: eliciting data from domain experts, and using uncertain data
for inference and planning. We believe that mitigation (and proper use) of uncertainty in the
early stages of software development calls for collaboration between the fields of Software
Engineering and Artificial Intelligence.
1. INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty exists (and often persists) in virtually every human endeavor. Software
development is no exception. On the one hand, psychological research of the past 50 years
[3,15,16] suggests that humans are notoriously poor and inconsistent estimators of uncertainties
associated with their activities. But there are, at times, severe penalties associated with a
human’s inability to correctly estimate the certainty of events, draw correct inferences, and
construct long-term plans that take uncertainty into account.
The software engineering process, regardless of lifecycle, programming language, or domain,
involves significant human decision-making. Often, the process of building software starts with a
collaboration of parties with expertise in completely different areas: software engineers,
requirements analysts, domain experts, customers, end users, knowledge engineers, etc. A
software engineer may know how to construct specifications and build software, while the
customer may have zero knowledge in that area. But the customer may know their domain very
well and may know what type of software is needed. In such situations, uncertainty stems from a
number of sources, including:
• misunderstandings between software engineers and domain experts;
• shortcomings in or inability to estimate the parameters
of post-deployment software operation in advance;
• conflicting opinions of domain experts; and
• conflicting priorities of stakeholders such as managers, and workers, etc.
Uncertainty exists both in the software development process (How long will it take? How
much will it cost? What is the most efficient process to develop this software? What is the right
choice of programming environment/language?) and in the software itself (How much security,
critical error-handling, and recovery needs to be implemented? What is the right trade-off
between efficiency and security, or between efficiency and functionality? What features of the
software will be used most heavily?). Probability theory, as well as other formalisms for dealing
with uncertain information (fuzzy logic/set theory, belief theory), provide guidelines for handling

uncertain information, once uncertainties have been established and properly quantified.
However, in many applications involving human participation, the process of establishing
uncertainties and quantifying them presents the greatest challenge [13,14,15,16]. When we start a
software project, we may be able to identify exactly where uncertainty appears (cost, time,
workloads, etc.). We must rely, however, on subjective human opinion (and experts who may not
agree on anything) to estimate these uncertainties. In certain situations, even discovering what is
uncertain is a challenge. When a brand new type of software is built, the lack of computer-related
expertise of the customer may prevent the customer from even realizing what is feasible and
what is not.
The good news is that these issues are not unique to software development. Elicitation of
uncertain information and quantification of qualitative uncertainties are topics currently
receiving much attention from the artificial intelligence researchers [18,13,8,9], as well as
psychologists [3,16,17], economists, and decision scientists [15]. In the rest of this paper, we
briefly discuss two things: the software development scenarios that lead to human-generated
uncertainties and the possibilities for applying artificial intelligence (AI) research to such
scenarios.
2. UNCERTAINTY IN EARLY STAGES OF SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
We posit that there are three research areas of importance when handling human evaluations
of uncertainty: elicitation of uncertainty information, reconciliation of such information, and
application of such information to decision-making. Further, we posit that AI research can
provide techniques for the elicitation of uncertainty information from domain experts and for
using uncertain data for inference and planning.
To illustrate our ideas, we present two scenarios to show how uncertainty might appear in
the software engineering process and/or product. We also suggest ways how existing AI work
might assist in dealing with the uncertainty.
Scenario 1. Uncertainty in final product.
Consider the following software development scenario. A team of developers is contracted
to develop and deploy software for a portable communications computer used by NASA on
manned space missions. A small communications computer is strapped on the astronaut’s space
suit.
The software is responsible for the quality of the communications, as well as their reliability
and robustness. The software can be designed to be very robust, running several processes in
parallel in case one fails, so that there is never a loss of the communications lines. However, this
comes at a penalty of a delay in the transmission and reception of messages. Based on this
knowledge, the requirements engineer begins to solicit requirements from the appropriate
NASA stakeholders.
Three stakeholders represent NASA in this process: the NASA mission control coordinator,
the space mission commander, and the mission specialist: the astronaut who will eventually be
the end-user of the software and the hardware. The mission coordinator wants to maximize the
reliability and would prefer to run three or four processes in parallel to ensure that
communications are never lost. Based on his experience with previous missions, he estimates
that there is a high probability that a single-process system will result in the loss of important
communications. The mission commander feels that getting information after a delay makes that
information almost useless and estimates that the chance of missing a very important

communication is small enough that it does not outweigh the need for immediacy in
communication. The mission specialist has a middle-of-the road view. She thinks that in the
long term, the probability of deteriorated communications is high enough to warrant some level
of redundancy, but she also thinks that any significant transmission delay would hamper her
work during the spacewalk and, thus, wants a compromise solution.
In this scenario, the development team has to decide on the eventual set of requirements, and
address directly the key controversy: how much redundancy is going to be implemented, and
how the redundancy mechanism will operate in the software. The key challenge lies in the fact
that the expert assessments of failure chances and risks associated with communications failure
are different, possibly even contradictory. The analysis of the situation turns into a two-step
process.
1. Reconcile the conflicts in the assessment of failure chances between experts, derive final
assessments.
2. Use obtained assessments in a risk-analysis procedure (e.g., probabilistic inference) to
determine the desired level of redundancy.
Scenario 2. Uncertainty about process.
A software development team receives a project which comes with a predefined budget,
deadlines, and a well-defined overall task. The project manager has to work within given
parameters and needs to find the best way to task different members of the team. She knows the
strengths and weaknesses of the team members. Some are better at formal tasks, such as
requirements engineering, some are better designers, and some are better developers. Some work
faster, but their code may be error-prone. Some produce code that passes all tests, but takes more
time to deliver it to the testers. Some, like the abovementioned testers, have a very limited scope
of responsibility. In the absence of work, these team members represent a loss of person-hours
devoted to the project. What is the best way for the project manager to proceed?
In this scenario, the uncertainty is associated with the selection of the correct process for
software development. If the project manager were willing to express her knowledge about the
quality and speed of the employees’ work in terms of probabilities (e.g., “there is about a 75%
chance that Steve will finish implementing this functionality within 3 weeks” or “there is an 80%
chance that Mary’s code will contain no severe defects”, “If Mary’s code contains no severe
defects, Paul can finish testing it within one week with probability 85%”)), and if she were
willing to quantify the utility (i.e., the expected benefit of assigning different tasks to different
people), then stochastic planning mechanisms[ 1,2], such as planning with Markov Decision
Processes [13,5], can be used to obtain a policy. Policies are functions from states to actions.
From a policy, the project manager will obtain not just a single sequence of suggested
assignments (Mary elicits requirements, Paul does design, Steve programs GUI, Mary programs
backend, Paul tests), but will receive suggestions that depend on the results of previous actions
(Mary elicits requirements; if she does it in three weeks, Paul does design, otherwise, Steve does
it). A policy will cover all eventualities.
With these scenarios in mind, we move to a discussion of what can be done to address these
types of uncertainty.
3. WHAT CAN BE DONE
Two issues arise from the scenarios in the previous section. We address each in turn.

Issue 1. Elicitation of Uncertain Information.
In each scenario (and in many other scenarios involving humans), the first step toward
the solution is obtaining reasonable, trustworthy, and consistent estimates of the
certainty/uncertainty of events. In the examples above, we suggested elicitation of probabilistic
estimates about the events. Other measures of uncertainty (fuzzy measures, measures of belief)
could be elicited, depending on the nature of uncertainty in the problem and the expertise of
programmers; our expertise is in probabilistic methods.
Uncertainty elicitation can be broken into two sub-problems.
1. Elicitation of probabilities from individual experts, and
2. consolidation of elicited probabilities, including resolution of conflicts.
Research has shown that different categories of people have different levels of comfort with
the measures of uncertainty. Development of good procedures for eliciting probabilities (and in
some cases, eliciting many probabilities) is an emerging topic in AI research. Various methods
[14,18,9] have been proposed and studied on different populations of users. There has not been,
to our knowledge, any research involving similar studies with domain experts representing
customers of large software projects.
Similarly, resolution of conflicts in probability assessments has been a topic of study in
recent years. Several complimentary methods were proposed recently [6,11,12]. Some methods
rely on statistical procedures which determine the most likely probabilities/ranges [6]. Some
methods use extra information to assign “weights” to the opinions of each expert and compute
the final assessment as the weighted average [11]. Some methods represent uncertainty in terms
of probability intervals or other imprecise measures [4].
Issue 2. Use of Elicited Uncertain Information.
In the scenarios discussed in Section 2, we mentioned two different types of procedures that
could use the probabilistic assessments. In the first scenario, risk assessment could be conducted
in a reasonably straightforward manner by combining the probabilities of events with the
utilities of various situations. Bayesian networks [19] and Bayesian inference can be used, if
probability assessments are conditional (e.g., the probability of communications failure depends
on: (a) the charge in the communications computer battery, (b) solar activity, and (c) the
amount of time the computer spends in vacuum. The latter depends on (d) the nature of work
(space walk) and (e) the astronaut completing the walk.).
In other situations, such as the one described in the second scenario, simple inference is not
enough. The goal of the project manager is not to predict the most probable state (e.g., the most
probable way in which the software will be used), but rather to plan [2,7] what actions to take to
achieve a goal or acquiring utility, in an ongoing scenario, or both. As mentioned above, a
policy computed by a program that handles uncertainty (such as SPUDD [5]) provides advice
for every possible state of the product development process in the foreseeable future.
4. THE CHALLENGE TO THE SOFTWARE ENGINEERING COMMUNITY
Software engineers are not alone in their attempts to deal with uncertainty, but the ball is in
their court in terms of taking actions. While the problems of reasoning with uncertainty are often
computationally hard [7,10] in general cases, many useful heuristics have been suggested and
implemented that make inference and planning feasible for reasonably large problems. What
remains to be seen is how this can be used by software engineers and incorporated into the
software development process. We suggest that empirical studies be undertaken for determining

a. the best means of eliciting probabilities from customers of software development projects
(or domain experts), and
b. the applicability and the cost benefit of using probabilistic reasoning in software
development projects.
These studies should be undertaken by software engineering and artificial intelligence
researchers working in concert. Together, the researchers can address the important problem of
dealing with uncertainty in software process and software products.
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